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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. ^78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW, AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY.
1.

Did the trial court err in denying the Bank of Utah's

(hereinafter Bank) motion for j.n.o.v. because the evidence was
insufficient as a matter of law to establish that Ivan J. Heslop
(hereinafter Heslop) was constructively discharged; the evidence
was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that Heslop had
an implied-in-fact contract terminable only for good cause and
was not an employee at will; and the evidence was sufficient as
a matter of law to establish good cause to terminate?
Standard

of

Review:

Is

the

verdict

supported

by

substantial and competent evidence, is the evidence insufficient
to

support

the

verdict,

and

does

the

evidence

clearly

preponderate in favor of the Bank so that reasonable people
could not differ on the outcome.

W. Fiberglass v. Kirton,

McConkie Etc., 7 89 P. 2d 34 (Utah App. 1990); Onybear v. Pro
Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990); Canyon Country
Store v.ffracey,781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989); Hansen v. Stewart,
761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988) .
2.

Did the trial court improperly admit evidence of an

accrual account problem, the State's investigations thereof, the
hiring and salary of Thomas Timmons, payments by the Bank to
Peat, Marwick, wash entries made by Beutler, and terminations of
other employees because such evidence was irrelevant under Rules
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

401 and 402, U.R.E., and/or was inadmissible under Rule 403,
U.R.E?
Standard of Review:

Abuse of discretion and whether a

substantial right of the party is affected.

Whitehead v.

American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990); Rule 103,
U.R.E.; Onyeabar

v.

Pro Roofing, Inc., supra; Pearce v.

Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985).
3.

Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the

jury that evidence of the accrual problem and matters related
thereto should be disregarded once Heslopfs public policy claim
was dismissed, or in the alternative, that it was only relevant
to the issue of good cause?
Standard of Review:

Same as stated in Issue 2; would the

Bank have obtained a more favorable result absent the error,
Rowley v. Graven Bros. & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d 1209
(1971) .
4.

Did the trial court err in denying the Bank's motion

for new trial due to insufficiency of evidence?
Standard of Review:

Is the evidence insufficient to

support the verdict, Hansen v. Stewart, supra; was the "'verdict
plainly

unreasonable

and

unconvincing1" evidence.

unjust1"

due

to

"'slight

and

King v. Fereday, 7 39 P. 2d 618 (Utah

1987).

2
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5.

Did the trial court err in denying the Bank's motion

for new trial because of admission of prejudicial evidence and
prejudicial

arguments and misstatements

by Heslopfs

counsel

during closing argument preventing the Bank from receiving a
fair trial and constituting error in law?
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. King v. Fereday,
supra.
6.

Did the trial court err in ruling that Berube v.

Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d

1033

(Utah 1989), should be

applied retroactively to the facts of this case?
Correctness of courtfs ruling.

Standard of Review:
particular

deference

conclusion.

should

be

granted

the

trial

No

court's

See Scharf v. B.M.G. Corp., 700 P. 2d 1068 (Utah

1985) .
7.

Did the trial court err in ruling that Heslop's claims

were not barred by the statute of frauds?
Standard of Review:

Same as stated in Issue 10.

STATUTES, AND/OR RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION
IS DETERMINATIVE
1.

Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence.

2.

Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence.

3.

Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence.

4.

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.

5.

U.C.A. #7-1-318.

6.

Rule 59, U.R.C.P.

7.

U.C.A. #25-5-4(1).
3
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The foregoing rules and statutes are set forth verbatim and
attached as Addendum 1 to the Bank's brief,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings,
and Disposition in the Trial Court.
This is an employment wrongful discharge case.

Heslop

alleged that the Bank constructively discharged him in October,
1983. Heslop further claimed he had an implied-in-fact contract
of employment terminable only for cause, and that he was not an
employee-at-will.
The Bank claimed Heslop voluntarily resigned, and that he
was an employee-at-will who could be terminated without cause.
Finally, the Bank asserted there was good cause to terminate.
Heslop filed suit in June, 1987. He asserted seven causes
of action.

(Record on Appeal, hereinafter R., 1-12) The trial

court dismissed Heslop's cause of action for defamation by order
dated May 25, 1989.

(R. 250-51)

By order and judgment dated

July 10, 1989, the court granted the Bank's motion for summary
judgment

as to Heslop's

causes

of action

for promissory

estoppel, breach of implied-in-law covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In the same order, the trial court ruled that Berube v. Fashion
Centre, Ltd., supra, should be applied retroactively to the
case.

(R. 359-61)

A copy of this Order and Judgment is

attached as Addendum 2.

4
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An additional partial summary judgment was entered by the
trial court on May 23, 1990, dismissing Heslop's cause of action
for tortious wrongful discharge, including all claims for tort
damages and punitive damages.

(R. 475-76)

The claims which remained for trial were whether Heslop was
constructively discharged, whether he had an implied-in-fact
contract

terminable

only

for cause, whether

he had

been

terminated in violation of public policy, and whether there was
good cause to terminate. At the end of Heslop's case in chief,
the court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss Heslop's public
policy claim.

(Transcript on Appeal, hereinafter Tr., 1149-51)

At the conclusion of all evidence, the Bank moved for a directed
verdict on the grounds that Heslop's claims were barred by the
statute of frauds, that there was no constructive discharge or
implied-in-fact contract and that the Bank had good cause to
terminate Heslop, as a matter of law.

(Tr. 1544-45) The court

denied the motion on the issue of good cause and took the
remainder of the motion under advisement pending the jury's
verdict.

The court stated it was a very close question on

whether to grant the motion on the constructive discharge issue.
The only evidence that corroborated Heslop's testimony that he
was asked to resign was Heslop's own resignation letter which
began:

"Pursuant to your request".

(Tr. 1552-53, 1559-61)

The jury returned a special verdict, finding Heslop did not
voluntarily resign, that he had an implied-in-fact contract,
{
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that the Bank did not have good cause to terminate him, and that
he had been damaged in the amount of $160,000.

(R. 644-45)

Judgment on the verdict was signed on August 27, 1990.
648a-648b)

(R.

Copy attached as Addendum 3. The court denied the

Bank's motion for j.n.o.v. or in the alternative for new trial
by order dated October 16, 1990. (R. 1182-85) Copy attached as
Addendum 4. Defendant's Notice of Appeal was filed November 13,
1990.
B.

(R. 1186-87)

Copy attached as Addendum 5.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Heslop's Employment Background and the
Bank's Employment Policy and Practice.

Heslop was first employed at the Bank in 1955.

(Tr. 112)

He worked there until 1959 when he left to take a different job.
(Tr. 112)
employment

When Heslop was hired
application

in 1955, he signed an

(Tr. 113; Exh. 1-P), in which he

expressly agreed that his continued employment "will depend upon
my usefulness to the bank, in its sole discretion; the bank
reserving the right to release me without notice, its obligation
ending with the payment of salary through the last day I work."
(Tr. 114; Exh. 1-P)
Heslop was rehired by the Bank in 1962.

(Tr. 112)

He

testified he discussed the terms of his rehire with Rod Browning
and Bill Beutler, both officers of the Bank.

(Tr. 116-119)

Heslop's understanding was that he had an employment contract to
work until he retired at age 65, unless there was good cause to
terminate.

(Tr. 296)

Heslop was not asked to sign another
6
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employment application/agreement when he was rehired in 1962.
(Tr. 119)
Heslop testified Beutler told him the Bank's policy was to
terminate employees only for good cause, or when there was a
major reduction in force.

(Tr. 120, 296)

Beutler had no

recollection of any details of what he discussed with Heslop in
1962.
ever

(Tr. 881)
telling

Specifically, Beutler had no recollection of

Heslop

he had

an employment

contract until

retirement which could only be terminated for cause.

(Tr. 887)

During all the years Beutler was employed at the Bank, he never
heard Frank Browning, who was president and chairman of the
board, or later Rod Browning, who became board chairman and
president of the Bank, say the Bank's policy was that employees
could only be terminated for cause.

(Tr. 886)

Beutler was

himself in charge of personnel at the Bank for many years. (Tr.
880) He could not recall any instance where he said, nor was he
aware of any instance where anyone else at the Bank ever said,
that an employee could only be terminated for good cause. (Tr.
919)
When Heslop was rehired in 1962, no one from the Bank
committed to him that he was being hired for six months, a year,
six years, ten years, or any fixed period of time.

(Tr. 293)

It was not the Bank's practice to have re-hired employees
sign another employment application.

The original personnel

file and the original employment application/agreement were
(

7
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revived.

(Tr. 884-85, 1016-17)

Several employees or former

employees of the Bank testified at trial. All of them signed an
employment application/agreement which contained the same atwill language as Heslop's.

These included Beutler on July 2,

1957 (Tr. 881-82; Exh. 68-D), Boyd Carlsen on March 9, 1960 (Tr.
741-42; Exh. 63-D), V. Ray Kennedy on November 16, 1956 (Tr.
1354-55; Exh. 87-D), Edward G. Kleyn in February, 1974 (Tr. 792;
Exh. 64-D), James K. Packer on January 15, 1958 (Tr. 634-35;
Exh. 58-D), Gerald Peacock on October 24, 1975 (Tr. 693-94; Exh.
61-D), Gerald R. West in November, 1961 (Tr. 542-44; Exh. 57-D),
and Roy Nelson on December 22, 1954 (Tr. 1433-34; Exh. 90-D).
At the time of trial, all of the above-named witnesses except
Kennedy and Nelson were no longer employed by the Bank.
The Bank's existing personnel records include files on six
or

eight

re-hired

employees.

In

every

case, the Bank

reactivated and used the original employment application for
that employee. (Tr. 14 34) For example, this happened with both
Gerald Peacock (Tr. 693-94) and Ray Kennedy (Tr. 1354-56), as
well as Heslop.
The Bankfs present employment application, which has been
in use for several years, contains the same basic employment-atwill language as all the other employment applications referred
to above.
president

(Tr. 1015-16, 1434-36; Exh. 91-D)
and

chief operating

officer

Roy Nelson,

of the Bank

8
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since

December, 1985, testified
regarding employment.

this reflects the Bank's policy

(Tr. 1372, 14 36)

Rod Browning is the controlling owner of the Bank. He owns
100% of the stock in Browning Bank Corporation, a holding
company which owns 66% of the Bank's stock.

(Tr. 1012)

Browning is chairman of the board. He was actively involved in
hiring for a number of years in the 1960's and part of the
1970 f s.

He never told any employees they could only be

terminated for cause.

(Tr. 1017-18)

As a practical matter,

however, over the years, the Bank has typically never fired
anyone without a reason.

(Tr. 1018)

Several former employees of the Bank testified their
understanding of Bank personnel policy was that they could only
be fired for cause.

(See Tr. 508, 620, 642-43, 704, 1364)

Gerald West testified he understood the language in the
employment application meant his employment with the Bank could
be terminated at the Bank's discretion.

He was never given

anything in writing which rescinded or changed that provision.
(Tr. 544)
Heslop was rehired as a loan officer in the installment and
commercial loan departments.

(Tr. 121)

He was made an

assistant vice president in 196 3 and became a vice president in
1966.

In 1976, he was appointed to the Officers Executive

Committee (OEC).

In 1980, Heslop was appointed senior vice

(

9
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president and manager of the Bank's commercial and installment
loan operations in the Salt Lake Division.
2.

(Tr. 121-22, 124)

Accrual Account Problems and Heslop's
First Offer to Resign.

The OEC oversaw general operations of the Bank on a day-today basis.

It held regular weekly meetings and also met each

month with the Bank's Directors Executive Committee (DEC). The
DEC consisted of five directors involved in setting Bank policy
and reviewing major decisions.

(Tr. 124)

Beutler was chairman of the OEC.
reported

to

the

OEC

a

$200,000

In spring of 1981, he

deficiency

in

the

time

certificate of deposit interest accrual expense account.

(Tr.

129) This was an internal account at the Bank. It was used to
maintain a running total of the amount of interest the Bank owed
on time certificates of deposit purchased by Bank customers.
(See Tr. 130-31)
In November, 1981, at a regular OEC meeting, Heslop asked
Beutler if the accrual deficiency had been corrected.
said it had not, and was now $500,000 or $1,000,000.

Beutler
(Tr. 135)

Beutler and Heslop argued about whether to report the
matter to Browning.

Heslop thought it should be reported.

Beutler did not. (Tr. 135) A couple of days later, the OEC met
with Browning.

The accrual problem was not mentioned.

Later

that day, Heslop called Browning and reported the problem.
Heslop also offered to resign because he was concerned Beutler
would think he had gone behind his back to Browning.
10
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Browning

told Heslop not to resign and that he would handle the problem
from there on.

(Tr. 136, 1020-21)

There were two methods of correcting the accrual account
deficiency.

One was to take an immediate one-time charge

against the Bank's undivided profits in an amount equal to the
total deficiency.

The other method was to make monthly,

installment charges against undivided profits until the entire
deficiency was eliminated.

(Tr. 138-39, 325, 906, 1026) Heslop

favored taking a one-time charge.
monthly, installment method.

Beutler recommended the

(Tr. 138-39, 325)

Beutler told

the OEC he had consulted with the Bank's outside accounting firm
of Fox & Company who had advised him the deficiency could be
cleared by use of the installment method.

(Tr. 336, 338, 589)

James Packer and Ray Kennedy, the two other members of the OEC,
followed Beutler»s recommendation.

(Tr. 590-92)

At the end of each calendar quarter, the Bank was required
to file a call report setting forth its financial condition with
the State Department of Financial Institutions.
On December 4, 1981, the OEC met with the DEC.

(Tr. 240)

During this meeting, Beutler explained the accrual deficiency.
He

said

it

amounted

to

approximately

$700,000.

Beutler

presented the two methods of resolving the deficiency, reported
Fox & Company's approval of either method, and recommended the
installment method, which was adopted by the DEC.

(Tr. 145,

342-43, 626-27, 845-46, 905-07, 1026-27, 1346, 1459-61) Beutler
<
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said the deficiency could be resolved in about six months. (Tr.
1026-27) Heslop did not object to use of the installment method
during this December 4 meeting. He did not recommend a one-time
charge.

He did not say the Bank's call reports would be false

and inaccurate if the deficiency was corrected over time. (Tr.
343-44, 1027-28, 1346)

Heslop subsequently prepared personal

notes detailing the accrual account problem and other Bank
matters.

In his notes, he claimed he believed the installment

method was a violation of Utah law. Nonetheless, he did not say
that at the December 4 meeting.

(See Exh. 39-P)

No one in attendance at the December 4, 1981, DEC meeting
suggested that handling the deficiency on a monthly basis was
illegal.

(Tr. 345)

All of the Directors on the DEC and also

Heslop had confidence in Beutler, who had been preparing the
Bank's call reports for a long time.
880)

(Tr. 347-48, 626, 627,

Browning relied on Beutler to prepare them.

1033-34)

(Tr. 880,

Browning believed it was perfectly proper to handle

the accrual problem over time.

(Tr. 1033-34)

Beutler did not believe the installment method was illegal
or improper. He believed the DEC adopted it in good faith. He
did not think any of them would intentionally break the law.
Beutler did not think the December, 1981, March, 1982, and June,
1982, call reports he prepared were false, misleading, or
intended to deceive.

(Tr. 905-09)
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Without knowledge of the DEC, Beutler, both before and
after the December 4, 1981, meeting made "wash entries" to the
accrual account when the quarterly call reports were due.

A

wash entry consisted of a book transfer of funds from one
internal bank account to the interest accrual account a day or
so before the date of the call report and a subsequent reversal
transfer of the same funds back to the original account a day or
two after the date of the call report. The purpose of the wash
entry was to prevent bank regulators from seeing the accrual
deficiency.
accounts.

(Tr. 832-33) The wash entries hid the TCD accrual
(Tr. 681)

Beutler nonetheless never told the DEC

that handling the deficiency on a monthly basis was improper.
(Tr. 905-09)
In July, 1982, Beutler notified the federal and state bank
regulators of the accrual account problem and the method being
used by the Bank to resolve the problem.

(Tr. 349, 858-60, 911-

12; Exh. 47-D)
Beutler

reported

to

the

Board

and/or

DEC

that

the

deficiency would be reduced to $80,000 by August, 1982, and was
basically taken care of.

(Tr. 601-02)

On August 2, 19 82, the federal and state bank examiners
started a regular examination of the Bank.

(Tr. 350)

The

accrual account problem was investigated. It was determined that
deficiencies existed which were much greater than Beutler had
ever disclosed to the DEC or the OEC.

(See Tr. 680, 982)
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On August 6, 1982, Elaine Weis, Commissioner of the State
Department of Financial Institutions, called a special meeting
of the Bank's Board of Directors.

Several regulatory people

were present, including representatives from the Utah State
Attorney General's Office and the Federal Reserve. (Tr. 598-99,
1039-40, 1445).

Weis issued an order suspending Beutler as

executive vice president and director, requiring an immediate
outside audit of the Bank, requiring that a representative of
the Commissioner be placed in residence in the Bank, requiring
the Bank to file corrected call reports for December 31, 1981,
March 31 and June 30, 1982, and specifically finding that
Beutler had violated £7-1-318, Utah Code Ann., relating to the
filing of false call reports. The order stated Beutler knew the
amounts shown in the accrued interest account were understated
by approximately $1.5 million at various times since October,
1981.

(Exh. 67-P)

Dee Hutzley, one of the Bank's directors,

spoke at this meeting on behalf of the other directors.

He

stated that they were all aware of the accrual problem and that
it would be entirely resolved within the next month.

(Tr. 599,

1040, 1446)
When the regulators indicated the deficiency was $1,000,000
or more, the Directors were in a state of shock and surprise.
(Tr. 628-29, 1040-41, 1446)
Ron Draughon, one of the state bank examiners, recommended
to Weis that Beutler be suspended because the call reports were
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inaccurate,

and

inaccuracy.
suspended

Beutler

accepted

responsibility

Draughon did not recommend

because Beutler admitted

for

the

that Browning be

he had

control of the

financial statements and was the person who put the financial
statements together, not Browning.

(Tr. 984-86)

Beutler

admitted at the August 6, 1982, meeting that preparing call
reports was his responsibility.

(Tr. 1041-42)

After the Commissioner's order was issued, while Draughon
was still in the Bank, he spoke with Browning and Kunz. He was
not conducting an investigation at this time, because that was
the Attorney General's job.

Out of curiosity, Draughon asked

Browning and Kunz whether they were aware of the magnitude of
the accrual deficiency before the examination started.
both indicated they were not.

(Tr. 976-78)

They

Draughon asked

Browning and Kunz this question after Draughon had already
discovered

a much larger accrual deficiency than had been

reported by Beutler.

(Tr. 990-91)

The Bank hired Peat, Marwick and Mitchell to perform a
complete audit. The partner in charge was Thomas Timmons. (Tr.
151-52, 1229)

The audit began in August, 1982, the work was

completed by the end of October, 1982 and the reports were
delivered to the Bank in early December, 1982.

(Tr. 1229-30)

Peat, Marwick found various accounting errors during its
audit, including the accrual account deficiency. Peat, Marwick
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recommended that the errors be corrected at one time—the same
recommendation as Heslop made in 1981.

(Tr. 152-53)

By order of Commissioner Weis dated February 23, 1983, all
restrictions placed on the Bank in the August 6, 1982, order
were removed.
3.

(Tr. 496-98; Exh. 56-D)

Attorney General Investigation.

Following Beutler's suspension, the Utah Attorney General's
Office (hereinafter Attorney General) conducted an investigation
of the Bank to determine if there was any criminal wrongdoing.
(Tr. 153-54) The Attorney General interviewed Ray Kennedy, Jim
Packer, David Kunz, and Tom Timmons.
23)

(Tr. 602-03, 1325, 1522-

Through its investigation, the Attorney General learned

about the December 4, 1981, DEC meeting, Beutler's explanation
of the two methods to handle the accrual deficiency, and the
DEC'S decision to adopt the monthly approach for resolving the
problem.

The Attorney General further learned that the DEC

received progress reports each month from Beutler concerning his
handling of the deficiency.

(Tr. 603, 1522-23)

The Attorney General's investigation was over by November,
December, or early January of 1983.

(Tr. 367, 633) No charges

were brought against the Bank or any of its officers or
directors.

(Tr. 368-69, 633, 912)

When Timmons met with the Attorney General, he was asked
whether the officers acted in a knowingly illegal manner, or if
they really did not understand what they were doing.

16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Timmons

told the Attorney General he believed they simply did not know
what they were doing, and not that they had intentionally filed
false statements.

(Tr. 1326-27)

Heslop met with the Attorney General two times. First, on
September 13, 1982. Heslop told the Attorney General he would
not disclose any information unless he was given a subpoena and
unless he had counsel present.

(Tr. 357) Heslop disclosed no

information during this meeting regarding the accrual problem.
(Tr. 154-56)
That same evening, Heslop received a telephone call at home
from David Kunz. Kunz asked Heslop why he met with the Attorney
General without talking to Kunz first. Even though Heslop was
a senior vice president at the Bank, knew that the Bank was
being investigated by the Attorney General, knew that Beutler
had been removed as an officer of the Bank by the Commissioner,
and felt that this investigation was a very serious matter, he
nonetheless did not feel he owed it to the Bank to mention that
the Attorney General had asked him to meet before attending the
September 13 meeting.

(Tr. 157, 356)

The second time Heslop met with the Attorney General was in
November, 1982. He was accompanied by Wayne Black, who had been
retained to represent the Bank. At this meeting, Black told the
Attorney General the Bank admitted there were errors in the call
report of December 31, 1981. He indicated there was confusion
among the Bank's management as to how the accrual problem should
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be handled.

He further stated that "Ivan is an activist.

He

wanted to take certain action right now. Others wanted to take
a more methodical approach."

Heslop told the Attorney General

he did not think any of the directors signed the call reports
with intent to defraud

and that they were acting on the

information given them.

Heslop also said no one had taken any

money from the Bank.

(Tr. 171, 17 3)

Heslop thereafter called the Attorney General to find out
the status of the investigation.

He was told it was being

closed, and that no charges would be brought. Heslop expressed
some concern about that because he felt it left him in a bad
position with his peers at the Bank. The Attorney General told
Heslop if he was withholding any information, he should tell
them about it. Heslop told the Attorney General, "I think you
know basically the information I have, only I am asking it be
received by subpoena."

The Attorney General said there was no

plan to issue any subpoenaes.

(Tr. 175-76)

At no time did Heslop ever give any of his personal notes
to the Attorney General. Nor did he ever discuss the contents
of his notes with the Attorney General.
4.

(Tr. 384-85)

Hiring of Tom Timmons.

During August, September, and October, 1982, Browning and
Kunz met with federal bank regulators.

The regulators were

concerned about the Bank's loans, capital and management and
wanted the Bank to hire someone with a strong accounting
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background to straighten out the Bankfs books because the Bank's
officers were weak in accounting. The regulators also said the
Bank needed someone with good executive skills.

(Tr. 1045-47,

1049, 1466-67)
As a result, the DEC began looking for a person who could
fill this function.

(Tr. 1047-48)

Consideration was given to

Packer, Kennedy, and Heslop, but the committee decided none of
them had the necessary skills.

(Tr. 1048)

The Peat, Marwick audit was going forward during this same
time frame.

The DEC members, and specifically Browning, were

impressed with Timmons.

(Tr. 1051)

In addition to the audit

work, Timmons also provided information for Kunz and Browning
with respect to raising additional capital

for the Bank.

Raising capital involved complex Federal Reserve regulatory
provisions under the Bank Holding Company Act.

Kunz learned

that Timmons had extensive experience in auditing banks and
other

financial

institutions,

and

also

in

dealing

with

regulatory matters with the State and the Federal Reserve. (Tr.
1468-69)
After Peat, Marwick's audit work was complete, Browning and
Kunz talked to Timmons about employment as president of the
Bank.

(Tr. 1049-50, 1052, 1240-41) These discussions were not

held until Kunz confirmed that Timmons was completely finished
with all his work on the audit.

(Tr. 1470-71)
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Timmons initially told Kunz he was not interested in the
job.

(Tr. 1241-42) One of the reasons was because of his large

income and potential income at Peat, Marwick.

Within 3 or 4

years, Timmons expected to be earning $225,000 to $250,000 a
year.

(Tr. 1239-40, 1241-43) After further discussion Timmons

changed his mind and was ultimately hired.

He signed a five-

year employment contract on December 17, 1982, and became
president and CEO effective January 15, 1983.

(Tr. 1053; Exh.

83-P) Before accepting the Bank's offer, Timmons conferred
with Peat, Marwickfs Salt Lake City managing partner, as well as
Peat, Marwickfs head office in New York City.

The Salt Lake

City managing partner did a complete partner review of Timmons'
audit of the Bank, confirmed that it was performed according to
professional standards and that all conclusions were adequately
supported.

(Tr. 1244-45)

Bank regulators have a system of rating banks from 1 to 5;
1 is the highest rating and 5 is the lowest.

When Timmons

became president of the Bank, it had a 5 rating. When he left
the Bank three years later, its rating was a 2.

(Tr. 1269-70)

Timmons1 starting salary at the Bank was $150,000, with a
10% annual increase and a provision for a bonus tied into Bank
profits.

(Tr. 1472-73)

When Timmons became president, the Bank did not meet
regulatory

requirements

regarding

capital.

20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Bank was

therefore required to input more capital. Browning, along with
other members of the board, came up with the additional money
and infusion of capital.
5.

(Tr. 665-66)

Reorganization of the Bank and Heslopfs
Second Offer to Resign.

Between the time Timmons signed his contract on December
17, 1982, and the time he officially began his duties in midJanuary, 198 3, he met and had discussions with Browning and
other members of the Board regarding the Bank's organization.
Sweeping changes were made because the Bank needed a complete
reorganization

to

improve

its

loan

quality

and

internal

accounting operations. (Tr. 1053-54, 1247-48) Reassignments of
top management

positions

Browning and the Board.
77-D and 78-D)

were made with

the

approval of

(Tr. 1056, 1065-66, 1248, 1474; Exh.

The DEC did not just review Timmons1 proposed

reorganization, but actually had more input on the changes than
Timmons did.

(Tr. 1324)

Included among the changes was the disbanding of the OEC
(Tr. 1056)

Almost every senior officer was involved in some

change of assignment.

(Tr. 147 3)

Jim Packer was removed as the Northern Division commercial
loan department head and put in charge of marketing and business
development. Packer had been a commercial loan officer for most
of his career. After the reorganization, Packer had no lending
authority.

(Tr. 637-38, 1057, 1249)
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Ray Kennedy had been manager of the real estate loan
department.

Another person was brought

department.

in to head that

(Tr. 6 38) Even Browning's title was changed. He

no longer was president and chief executive officer, but
remained chairman of the board.

(Tr. 1057-58)

Heslop was moved from the Salt Lake City office back to the
Bank's main office in Ogden to work as a commercial loan officer
and agricultural loan specialist.

He retained his title as

senior vice president and his same salary.

(Tr. 369-70, 376,

1054-55, 1249-50)
Heslop had more experience with agricultural lending than
any other loan officer at the Bank.

The Bank had a lot of

distressed agricultural loans at this time. It was important to
have someone with Heslop's expertise to help with distressed
agricultural loans.
Even

before

(Tr. 547, 781, 1249-50)
Beutler

was

removed

as

executive

vice

president, the Bank had been required to enter into a memorandum
of understanding with the Federal Reserve because of various
problems at the Bank, including capitalization and problem
loans.

This memorandum required the Bank to make various

changes as well as to make periodic status reports to the
regulators.

(Tr. 636, 782, 1042-43)

Heslop knew the regulators had told the Bank it needed to
reorganize. Heslop understood that was exactly what Timmons was
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doing so that another accrual-type problem did not occur. (Tr.
371-72)
Heslopfs lending authority on secured loans was increased
after Timmons became president from $30,000 to $50,000.

(Tr.

392-95; Exh. 48-D, 49-D, and 50-D)
When Timmons explained Heslop's new assignment to him in
early January, 198 3, Heslop objected
considered it a demotion.

to the change.

(Tr. 193, 1250-51)

He

Timmons said it

was not a demotion. His only reason for reassigning Heslop was
to help the Bank.

(Tr. 369-70, 1255-56)

Heslop subsequently met with Browning on the weekend before
the Bank's annual stockholders meeting in January, 198 3.

He

again objected to the new assignment and offered to resign.
Browning specifically told Heslop not to resign and encouraged
him to stay on as an employee, which Heslop did. Browning also
told Heslop the change was a lateral transfer and was in the
best interest of the Bank.
60)

(Tr. 193-94, 196-97, 374-75, 1058-

Browning felt the Bank always had the right to change an

employee's assignment. This occurred many times over the years
to both middle and senior management personnel.

(Tr. 1018-19)

Heslop continued to work as a commercial loan officer and
agricultural loan specialist from January of 198 3 until October
of 1983.
Timmons was unaware at the time of the reorganization that
Heslop had opposed the installment method for handling the
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accrual account deficiency.

He did not learn until March or

April of 1983 that Heslop supported a one-time charge, (Tr. 388,
1251-52), which was the same solution Timmons required as part
of Peat, Marwick's audit in the fall of 1982.
The Bank had two reductions of force in 1983. A small one
occurred in the spring and a larger one in the fall. Heslop was
not included in either.
6.

(Tr. 636-37, 1067-68)

New Loan Policy.

The Board adopted a written loan policy in April, 1983.
(Tr. 1256-57, 1474)

The policy restricted new agricultural

loans. They were considered undesirable because the Bank had so
many existing problem agricultural loans. The Bank wanted its
officer's to be very prudent in making new agricultural loans.
(Tr. 565, 782-83)
Loan policy 13 listed desirable and undesirable loans.
Undesirable loans included loans to establish a new business
enterprise, if repayment of the loan was dependent solely upon
the profitable future operation of the enterprise, in the
absence of supporting additional collateral or financially
substantial guarantors; and loans whose repayment was dependent
solely upon the marketing of a growing crop or livestock, in the
absence of supporting additional collateral or financially
substantial

guarantors.

Loan

committee

undesirable loans was specifically required.

approval

of all

(Exh. 17-P)
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It is the responsibility of a loan officer to make loans
within the scope of the policy set by the Bank. If he fails to
do that, then he is not acting within his lending authority.
(Tr. 564)
The new loan policy allowed loan officers to combine their
lending authority to approve loans. This was designed to take
care of rush-type situations.

In most instances., Timmons and

the directors wanted loans to go through a loan committee
approval process.
7.

(Tr. 395, 1273-74; Exh. 50-D)

Gabbert Loan.

In early August of 1983, Heslop was approached by a man
named Larry Richins regarding a $260,000 loan application for
Dr. Clayton Gabbert.

The loan was to be used by Gabbert to

purchase 310 head of cattle which he would then lease to Richins
who was going to operate a dairy in Newton, Utah.

Richins1

lease payments to Gabbert were to be used by Gabbert to make his
loan payments to the Bank.

(Tr. 20 3-04)

After Heslopfs initial presentation to the loan committee,
Heslop was asked to get more information about the loan, which
was an agricultural loan.

(Tr. 521, 783-84, 786)

On August 5, 198 3, West approved the loan subject to the
condition that Gabbert, in addition to securing the loan with
the cattle, also either make a $50,000 cash investment of his
own into the project or provide additional collateral in the
amount of $50,000.

(Tr. 430, 432-33, 557, 786-87, 1077, 1079,
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1278-79, 1388-89; Exh. 7-P)

Heslop was required to see that

this condition was met before he could close and disburse the
loan.

If the condition could not be met, Heslop was obligated

to ask West for a change in the approval, which West testified
Heslop did not do,
approved, subject

(Tr. 557-58, 565-66, 1395)
to

The loan was

this condition, by Heslop

combining their individual lending authorities.
approved by the loan committee.
1272-7 3; Exh. 7-P and 5 3-D)

and West
It was not

(Tr. 554-55, 766-67, 784-85,

It did not meet the Bank's loan

policy requirement of specific loan committee approval on
undesirable loans.

(Tr. 556)

Gabbert owned property in Bountiful which he represented on
his financial statement had a value of approximately $90,000
with a first mortgage of approximately $38,000. (Exh. 8-P) The
loan was scheduled to close on Monday, August 22, 198 3.

On

Friday, August 19, the Bank's appraiser appraised the Bountiful
property at $45,000.

(Exh. 12-P)

He found it had a first

mortgage of approximately $33,000. (Exh. 7-P) This left total
equity of $12,000, but in reality the property had no "loanable
equity", meaning there was not enough equity to feasibly use as
collateral. The Bank would not normally take a second mortgage
under such circumstances. (Tr. 430-31, 559-60) For the Bank to
realize anything from the Bountiful home in case of default, it
would have to pay $3 3,000 for the first mortgage, as well as a
real estate commission and other costs associated with a sale.
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The Bank would never realize even $12,000 from such a sale.
(Tr. 431-32, 735)
In spite of the appraisal, Heslop closed the loan on August
22 and disbursed the funds,

(Exh. 7-P)

Although he took a

second mortgage on the Bountiful property, Heslop did not meet
the $50,000 condition.

Dr. Gabbert did not invest any of his

own money into the project.

(Tr. 558, 1079-80, 1278-79, 1389)

West had no recollection of ever telling Heslop it was okay to
close the loan without meeting the $50,000 condition. (Tr. 559)
West had no recollection of seeing the appraisal on Gabbertfs
Bountiful home.

He testified the loan should not have been

disbursed in light of Heslop's failure to meet the $50,000
condition.

(Tr. 557-58)

Heslop, on the contrary, testified

West told him to commit to disburse on the loan even before the
Bountiful property had been appraised.

(Tr. 46 3)

Bank loan policy No. 7 required all loans over $100,000 to
have

advance

review

and

approval

documentation by the Bank's counsel.
with the Gabbert loan.

of

supporting

legal

Heslop did not do this

(Tr. 498-99)

Gabbertfs personal income was insufficient to make the
payments. Specifically, his net income after federal income tax
in 1981 was approximately $68,000 and in 1982 was approximately
$75,000.

(Exh. 10-P)

more than $72,000.

The annual payment on the note totaled

(Exh. 13-P)

It was essential that Richins

make the lease payments to Gabbert from the dairy operation so
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that Gabbert could make the loan payments to the Bank.

(Tr.

421-22, 562-64, 736-38, 1085)
The first payment on the loan was due September 25, 1983.
(Exh. 13-P) Richins filed for bankruptcy before that date, and
Gabbert was unable to make his first payment.

(Tr. 241, 1439)

Richins' bankruptcy created a lot of problems for the Bank in
trying to salvage the loan.

(Tr. 768-70) Ultimately, the Bank

and Gabbert were involved in litigation over this loan.

(Tr.

1508)
About two weeks before the first payment came due on the
loan, Boyd Carlsen, vice president in charge of loan review at
the Bank, performed a routine review of the Gabbert loan. (Tr.
701-02, 711, 713; Exh. 54-D) No one told him to single the loan
out for special review.

(Tr. 740, 1274)

Carlsen prepared a

loan review report indicating he could not give the loan a
rating because it was inadequately documented.
Exh. 62-D)
loan.

(Tr. 726-27;

His report identified various deficiencies in the

He was very critical of it.

For example, the file did

not even document that the full number of cattle was purchased
as anticipated under the loan approval. Carlsen submitted a set
of questions to Heslop as part of the review.

One question

asked whether additional collateral was needed. Heslop answered
that additional collateral was not needed, and that Dr. Gabbert
had invested $50,000 of his own money into the project.
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This

statement was clearly false. (See Tr, 442-44, 446-47, 567, 714,
716-18, 727-34, 743, 747-48, 753-55; Exh. 15-P and 55-D)
The Gabbert loan violated the Bank's written loan policy
because it involved a new business undertaking (the dairy farm)
and did not have any guarantors.

(Tr. 398-401, 1086)

In

addition, it was solely dependent on the profitable future
operation of the dairy business for repayment because Gabbert's
personal income was inadequate to make payment.
1205)

(Tr. 1088-89,

It also did not have supporting additional collateral

because the second mortgage on the Bountiful home was worthless
(Tr. 1089), and it was also dependent solely upon the marketing
of milk from the dairy for repayment.

(Tr. 1089-90, 1205)

Mr. Browning's opinion was that the Gabbert loan violated
Bank loan policy.
loan.

He identified numerous problems with the

(Tr. 1069-77, 1079-86)

Timmons also concluded the loan

violated Bank loan policy for numerous reasons.
1283)

(Tr. 1275-81,

Roy Nelson, the Bank's present president, who reviewed

and analyzed the loan and testified as an expert in lending,
also concluded it violated the Bank's loan policy.

(Tr. 1388-

95)
Browning, Timmons and Nelson all testified there is a
significant difference between a loan that goes bad and a loan
that violates loan policy. The Bank is willing to take the risk
of loans that go bad when made within the scope of the lending

I
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policy, but not loans that violate policy.

(Tr. 1086-87, 1258-

59, 1382, 1384-85)
8.

Rescission of Heslop's Lending Authority.

Because of the loan policy violations involved with the
Gabbert loan, Browning and Timmons were concerned about the
safety of the Bank's assets.

They did not want Heslop making

any more Gabbert-type loans.

As an immediate, temporary

protective measure, Timmons and Browning decided to revoke
Heslop1s lending authority.

On September 29, 1983, Timmons

issued a memorandum to West which removed Heslopfs lending
authority. The memo required either West or Ed Kleyn to approve
Heslopfs loans before a commitment was made to a customer. In
addition, West's lending authority was reduced from $250,000 to
$100,000.

The policy of allowing loan officers to combine

lending limits was restricted so that no loan in excess of
$100,000 could be made without prior approval of Browning,
Timmons, or the Directors Loan Committee.

This memorandum,

therefore, affected several loan officers' authority. (Tr. 56869, 1091, 1283-84; Exh. 16-P)
Both Browning and Timmons considered the rescission of
Heslop's lending authority a temporary, stopgap measure until
they could find out more specifics about the Gabbert loan. (Tr.
1094-95, 1285)
One of the reasons immediate action was necessary was
because the Bank was still reporting, pursuant to the memorandum
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of understanding, on a monthly basis to the Bank regulatory
authorities on improvement of its loan portfolio.

The Gabbert

loan was a violation of the goal of improving loan quality.
(Tr. 1091-92)

Specifically, the Bank had to report on the

status of any problem loans over $50,000.

(Tr. 822-23)

Timmons1 September 8, 1983, letter to the regulators reported
progress in reducing past-due loans and in correcting credit
file documentation problems found by the regulators. He further
reported the delinquency level on loans was a primary concern at
the Bank and that a special senior management task force had
been formed to address and study the issue. He stated the Bank
was implementing the committee's suggestions and anticipated
significant improvement in loan delinquency levels during the
remainder of 1983.

(Tr. 1339-40; Exh. 86-D)

The next day

Carlsen's loan report on the Gabbert loan was issued showing
such poor documentation that no rating could be given.

(Tr.

1341)
Although Heslop could not independently commit to loans
under the terms of the September 29, 1983, memorandum, he could
still perform all other duties of a loan officer.

He could

interview and screen applicants and take loan applications,
present loans to the loan committee for approval, assemble
documentation and file forms and documents after approval,
service loans after approval and disbursement, and discuss and
give advice about loans to other officers.

(Tr. 789-91, 1095i
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96, 1286)

Heslop1s responsibilities as a loan officer to

service the loan continued even after it was approved and
disbursed.

His post-disbursal responsibilities were equally

important as the responsibilities leading up to and including
approval.

(Tr. 303-04, 306)

Neither Browning nor Timmons intended to fire Heslop by
removing his lending authority.

Heslop retained his title as

senior vice president, as well as his same salary.
95, 1286)

(Tr. 1094-

West did not think the rescission of lending

authority was a permanent change. He told Heslop to stay on at
the Bank and work with the change.

(Tr. 569) Kleyn and Heslop

had a good working relationship, and Kleyn told Heslop they
could work together with the restrictions on Heslopfs lending
authority.

(Tr. 791)

Although it is difficult for a loan

officer to act with no lending authority, it does not prevent
him from performing his job.

This was especially true at the

Bank where loan officers had a close relationship.

(Tr. 774)

Kleyn testified it is prudent for a loan officer to take a day
to consider and think about a loan before committing on it.
This restriction allowed Heslop to do that.

(Tr. 791)

Moreover, customers never know a loan officer's lending
authority.

(Tr. 800, 1095-96)

Kleyn testified there are loan

officers who function without independent lending authority. In
his job at First Security Bank, Kleyn at one time could not
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exercise his lending authority without prior approval from
another officer.

(Tr. 800-01)

Timmons had no reason for rescinding Heslopfs lending
authority or reducing West's lending authority other than the
Gabbert loan.

(Tr. 1287)

Nelson testified that the action

taken by Timmons and Browning was justified.

While Nelson was

the senior lending officer at Commercial Security Bank, he was
frequently involved in disciplinary actions relating to lending.
He changed lending authorities, took lending authorities away,
and also gave them back.
9.

(Tr. 1396-97)

Heslop's Resignation.

After Heslop read the 9-29-83 memorandum, he spoke with Ed
Kleyn and requested three days vacation to think about what he
was going to do.

Kleyn agreed he could take time off.

(Tr.

242, 77 3) Heslop indicated he might resign. Kleyn told Heslop
that whatever he decided to do, to please put it in writing for
Kleyn.

(Tr. 775-76, 1475)

Heslop sent an October 3, 1983, letter to Browning and each
member of the Board requesting a special meeting.

Heslop was

critical of the Bank, its directors, and its management in this
letter.

(Tr. 245-48; Exh. 20-P)

Heslop testified Kleyn subsequently told him the board had
denied his request for a meeting and demanded he submit his
written resignation.

(Tr. 249)

Kleyn is an area manager for

First Security Bank in Ogden. His duties include supervision of
i
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all operations, and all installment and commercial loans for
eight of First Security's branches. He has a personal lending
limit of $200,000, and in conjunction with another officer, can
lend up to $1,000,000.

He has worked at First Security Bank

since 1984 when he left the Bank of Utah.

(Tr. 756-57, 777-78)

Kleyn unequivocally denied he ever told Heslop to resign or that
anyone from the Bank ever told him to tell Heslop to resign. He
further testified he did not ever tell Heslop he could not have
a hearing with the board.

(Tr. 788-89)

Timmons did not instruct Kleyn or anyone else at the Bank
to ask for Heslop1s resignation.

(Tr. 1286)

West never told

Heslop to resign, nor did anyone at the Bank tell West to demand
Heslop1s resignation.

(Tr. 569-70)

On October 5, 198 3, Heslop returned to the Bank and
submitted his written resignation to Kleyn.
21-P)

(Tr. 250-51; Exh.

On October 6, 1983, Heslop met with the full board, at

which time he said if they did not order Timmons to restore his
lending authority, Heslop would resign.

(Tr. 1482-83) Heslop

criticized the Bank and its management on several issues.
stated his resignation was effective October 18, 1983.

He
(Tr.

253-58; Exh. 22-P)
Following Heslop1s statement, a motion was made to accept
his resignation, which was passed unanimously.
148 3)

(Tr. 1093-94,

Board member Spencer Baggs voted to accept Heslop's

resignation because Heslop said he wanted to resign. (Tr. 1349)
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Dee Hutzley voted to accept Heslop1s resignation because Heslop
no longer supported Bank management.

(Tr. 1447-48)

By letter dated October 6, 1983, Heslop was notified his
resignation had been accepted by the Board. He was paid through
October 18, 1983.

(Exh. 23-P)

September 29, 1983, was a

Thursday. Heslop took vacation on September 30, October 3, and
4.

He submitted his written resignation on October 5, and had

his meeting with the board on October 6. He, therefore, did not
work one day at the Bank after his lending authority was
rescinded.
10.

Good Cause for Termination.

Disloyalty constitutes good cause to terminate an employee.
(Tr. 580-81) On several occasions, Heslop exhibited disloyalty
through excessive criticism of Bank management and directors.
Before Beutler left the Bank, Heslop was dissatisfied that
Beutler was exercising too much authority.

Heslop felt he had

been reduced to the status of a routine bank clerk as a result.
(Tr. 313-15, 318-20; see Exh. 39-Pa and 39-Pb)
On December 23, 1982, Heslop wrote "Roderick Browning as
Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer has
been unable to manage the bank in a successful manner." Heslop
suggested that new Bank legal counsel be appointed and that a
new president and/or executive vice president from the community
be appointed.

(See Tr. 483-88; Exh. 39-Pb at 20-21)

West

testified an employee who says the chairman of the board is not
i
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capable of performing or that the president should be relieved,
is not a loyal employee.
11.

(Tr. 549)

Evidentiary Rulings by Trial Court.

Heslop presented evidence, over objection, regarding wash
entries made by Beutler, Timmons' hiring

and salary, and

payments made by the Bank to Peat, Marwick during 1982 and 198 3
in the amount of approximately $445,000.

(Tr. 681-82, 803-11,

830-31, 1112-14, 1564-65; R. 668-94) Regarding Timmons1 hiring,
plaintiff's counsel claimed during cross-examination of Browning
that the hiring was

fl

[a]n inside job" and that standard

procedure had not been followed.

Defendant objected, and the

court admonished plaintiff's counsel that if he was suggesting
impropriety, he better be prepared to back it up.
questioned

how

termination.

hiring

Timmons

was

connected

to

The court
Heslop's

(Tr. 1118-19)

Hearings were held outside the presence of the jury
regarding the admissibility of evidence of Timmons1 salary and
the payments to Peat, Marwick. (Tr. 1120-30, 1152-65) Addendum
6 to the Bank's brief is a transcript of these hearings.
Plaintiff's counsel claimed the evidence was relevant to show
the Bank bought Timmons' silence about information he learned in
his audit that was damaging to Browning and Kunz and could
result in their suspension by the state. No such evidence was
ever produced by plaintiff.
Moreover, three

(Tr. 1122-23, 1126, 1129, 1155-57)

separate motions

to compel production of
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Timmons* salary information were denied during the course of the
litigation prior to trial.

(R. 52, 61-62, 66-67, 485-86) The

second order specifically stated the information was irrelevant.
(R. 66-67)
Counsel for plaintiff claimed the evidence of payments to
Peat, Marwick was relevant because they were improper.
1120-23,

1126,

1129,

1154-55)

However,

arrangement was based on profitability.

Timmons1

(Tr.
bonus

(Exh. 8 3-P) He had no

incentive to increase costs by paying high rates to Peat,
Marwick.

The innuendo, however, was that the Bank was acting

improperly and even that Timmons was receiving kickbacks from
Peat, Marwick, one of the largest accounting firms in the world.
(Tr. 1162)
Although the court recognized this "evidence is obviously
highly prejudicial" (Tr. 1128), he nonetheless admitted it over
the Bank's objection and motion to strike. This ruling was made
after the Bank proffered evidence to the court in chambers which
explained the reasons for the payments to Peat, Marwick, and
which the court recognized showed the payments were proper.
(Tr. 1152-65) As a result of the court's ruling, the Bank was
required to put on evidence explaining all the payments it made
to Peat, Marwick (Tr. 1232-37, 1334-35, 1398-99), as well as the
salary it paid Timmons and the reasons for hiring Timmons.
Evidence was also presented by Heslop, over objection of
the Bank, regarding the circumstances of termination of several
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other Bank employees.

(Tr. 5 36-40)

For example, over both

objection and motion to strike, the court allowed Beutler to
testify that Kunz talked him out of a hearing with Commissioner
Weis in August, 1982 following his suspension.

Beutler was

allowed to testify that he did not want to "take the fall" for
the Bank.

Beutler suggested that the Bank's holding company

bought his condominium as a settlement for Beutler's agreement
to waive his hearing with the Commissioner.

(Tr. 869-74)

In

fact, Beutler later filed a lawsuit against the Bank for
wrongful discharge, which was dismissed in its entirety on a
motion for summary judgment in December, 1984.

(Tr. 1478-79)

While cross-examining Browning, plaintiff's counsel claimed
Beutler

"took the fall" for Browning and the Bank, which

Browning unequivocally denied.

(Tr. 1107-09)

In addition, the court allowed Carlsen to testify about the
circumstances surrounding his firing, which happened after
Heslop left the Bank. Carlsen was expressly fired and escorted
from the Bank the same day.
Prior

to

(Tr. 722-23)

trial, the Bank

filed

a motion

in limine

requesting exclusion of all evidence regarding the accrual
account problem and the investigations of the problem on the
grounds it was irrelevant under Rule 401, U.R.E., or was
inadmissible

under

Rule

403, U.R.E.

defendant's motion in limine.

The

court

denied

Copy of Order attached as

Addendum 7. Defendant objected to this same evidence at trial,
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which objection the court overruled.

(R. 396-410, 487-88; Tr.

131-32)
After the court dismissed Heslopfs public policy claim (Tr.
1149-51), counsel for the Bank asked the court if his ruling did
not make evidence of the accrual problem and Heslopfs reaction
to it irrelevant.

(Tr. 126 3)

The court stated the accrual

problem was still relevant, but only with respect to whether the
Bank had good cause to discharge Heslop, which would only become
an issue if the jury found Heslop had been constructively
discharged and that Heslop had an implied-in-fact contract
terminable only for good cause.

(Tr. 126 3-64) A copy of the

court's ruling is attached as Addendum 8.
However, the court did not instruct the jury that evidence
of the accrual problem was irrelevant to the constructive
discharge and implied-in-fact contract issues.

(Tr. 1265-66,

1267-68) The Bank took exception to the court's failure to rule
the accrual evidence and everything related to it out of the
case once the public policy claim was dismissed.
12.

(Tr. 1666)

Improper Closing Argument.

On three separate occasions during

closing argument,

Heslop1s attorney stated that Ron Draughon testified Browning
and Kunz told him they knew nothing about the accrual problem
before the August, 1982, Bank examination.

(Tr. 1590, 1610,

1654-55) This was clearly not Draughon1s testimony.
78)

During

cross-examination

of

Browning,

(Tr. 976the

court
i

39
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

specifically sustained an objection involving this evidence and
stated on the record Draughon did not testify that Browning told
him he was surprised to learn about the accrual problem in
August, 1982.

(Tr. 1218) Copies of the transcript of Heslop's

argument, Draughon1s testimony, and the court's ruling are
attached as Addendum 9.
Heslop's improper argument was that Browning and Kunz lied
to Draughon, a representative of the Department of Financial
Institutions.
When the court overruled the Bank's objection to the
admission of evidence of payments made to Peat, Marwick, he told
Heslop's counsel:

"We are not going to try the Bank for

everything that happened during those years."

(Tr. 1164)

However, that is exactly what Heslop's argument was designed to
do.
Heslop testified he did not ascribe any criminal intent to
the Bank's officers or directors. He told the Attorney General
that. He memorialized it in his notes. He told the state bank
examiners the Bank had 260 honest people. He did not tell them
he was the only honest person involved in the accrual account
decisions.
argued,

in

(See Exh. 39-Pa and Pb)
substance,

that

Heslop

Yet, plaintiff's counsel
was

the

only

honest,

noncriminal person among the group of officers and directors
involved in the accrual problem.

(Tr. 63-64, 1607-09, 1655,
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1657-58, 1661) Copies of relevant portions of Heslop's opening
statement and closing argument are attached as Addendum 10.
Heslop's counsel further argued that the evidence of
Timmons' hiring as president, his salary, and the payments to
Peat, Marwick were unusual.

He implied there was something

wrong because Timmons signed several of the Bank's checks to
Peat, Marwick.

(Tr. 1610-11)

Heslop's counsel referred to

Timmons in closing argument as follows:

"You remember Mr.

Timmons, he was the one making all the money."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

(Tr. 1598)

^

The trial court erred in denying the Bank's motion for

j.n.o.v. because:
a.
investigation

Evidence of the accrual account problem, the
thereof, the hiring

and

salary

of Timmons,

payments made by the Bank to Peat, Marwick, the wash entries
made

by

Beutler, and

improperly admitted.
case.

termination

of other

employees was

It was irrelevant to the issues in the

It served to prejudice the jury against the Bank and to

blacken the Bank's image in the eyes of the jury.

The

prejudicial effect of such evidence outweighed any probative
value it had and affected the jury's decision with regard to the
constructive discharge, implied-in-fact contract, and good cause
issues.

Browning's refusal to accept Heslop's offer to resign

in January, 1983, cut off any causal connection between events
in 1981-82 and Heslop's termination.
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b.

When Heslopfs lending authority was removed, he

was not constructively discharged.

He could still perform all

duties of a loan officer, except to independently commit. The
rescission of his lending authority would not lead a reasonable
person to conclude that continued employment was intolerable.
Heslop had a reasonable alternative to resignation.

When an

employee has a reasonable alternative, but nonetheless resigns,
his resignation is voluntary, as a matter of law.
c.

Heslop did not have an implied-in-fact contract

of employment terminable only for cause.
at-will agreement.

He signed a written

Heslop and other employees subjectively

believed the Bank's policy was to terminate employees only for
cause, but that was not the Bank's intent. An implied-in-fact
agreement cannot override an express at-will agreement.
d.

Assuming, arguendo, Heslop was terminated, the

Bank had good cause. The Gabbert loan was a violation of Bank
policy which occurred at a time when the Bank was under scrutiny
from the federal and state Bank regulators with regard to
problem loans. Further, Heslop was a disloyal employee. He was
highly critical of Bank management, including the chairman of
the board, the Bank's chief legal counsel, and the new president
chosen by the Board of Directors.
2.

The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury

that evidence of the accrual account problem was only relevant
to the issue of good cause and should be disregarded in
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determining whether Heslop was constructively discharged and
whether there was an implied-in-fact contract,
3.

The trial court also erred by denying the Bank's

motion for new trial because:
a.
jury's

There was insufficient evidence to support the

verdict.

Rule

59(a)(6), U.R.C.P.

Heslop

had a

reasonable alternative to resignation, there was no substantial
evidence that he was asked
resignation was voluntary.

to resign, and

therefore his

The evidence of an implied-in-fact

contract was overridden by the written at-will contract signed
The Gabbert loan and Heslopfs

by Heslop and other employees.

disloyalty established good cause to terminate.
b.

The improperly admitted evidence set forth in

paragraph l.a., supra, prejudiced the jury against the Bank and
prevented the Bank from having a fair trial. Further, Heslop1s
attorney's
testimony
Department

improper

closing

argument

which

suggesting Browning and Kunz lied
of Financial

Institutions

and

misrepresented
to the State

that Heslop was

terminated because he was honest were highly prejudicial and
improperly influenced the jury.
4.

Rule 59(a)(1) and (7).

Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd., supra, was decided

approximately five and a half years after Heslop's termination.
It made substantial changes in employment law.

It should not

have been applied retroactively to this case. Prior to Berube,
it was not uncommon for courts to find employee-at-will status
<
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if an employee had no agreement for a specified term.

Had

Berube not been applied to this case, Heslop would not have been
able to sustain a cause of action.
5.

If Heslop fs testimony

is true, then he had an

employment contract to work until he retired
terminable only for cause.

at age 65,

Such a contract is barred by the

statute of frauds because it could not have been performed
within less than one year since Heslop was only 29 years old
when he was rehired in 1962.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE BANK'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V.
J.N.O.V. may be granted by the trial court where there is
an "absence of any substantial evidence to support the verdict."
Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967)
"[A] j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the losing party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hansen v. Stewart,
761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988) .
On appeal, this Court reviews the trial court's denial of
the Bank's motion for j.n.o.v. to determine if the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury verdict, and/or whether the
evidence clearly preponderated in favor of the Bank so that
reasonable people could not differ on the outcome.

See W.

Fiberglass v. Kirton, McConkie, Etc., supra, Onybear v. Pro
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Roofing, Inc., supra, Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, supra,
Hansen v. Stewart, supra.
For the following reasons, the Bank requests this Court to
reverse the judgment and the trial court's denial of the Bank's
motion for j.n.o.v. and remand with instructions to enter
judgment for the Bank.
A.

Improperly Admitted Evidence.
A basic predicate to the Bank's position is that irrelevant

and/or prejudicial evidence was admitted regarding the accrual
account problem, investigations thereof by the State, the hiring
and salary of Tom Timmons, payments by the Bank to Peat,
Marwick, and terminations of other employees. All this evidence
was irrelevant to the questions of constructive discharge,
implied-in-fact contract, and good cause.

Rules 401, 402,

U.R.E.
Such evidence did not have "any tendency to make the
existence

of

any

fact

that

is

of

consequence

to

the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." See Rule 401, U.R.E. There
was no causal connection between that evidence and Heslop's
termination.
Even if it were considered relevant, the probative value
was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the
evidence on the Bank and was therefore inadmissible under Rule
403, U.R.E. The evidence prejudiced the jury by intimating the
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Bank committed criminal acts in bad faith, that the Bank's
directors and officers were dishonest, that Heslop was the only
honest person involved in the accrual problem, and in general to
blacken the Bank in the eyes of the jury. Evidence which tends
to influence the outcome of the trial by improper means, such as
appealing to the jury's sympathy or provoking an instinct to
punish or otherwise cause the jury to base its decision on
something other than facts of the case is unfairly prejudicial.
See Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institute, 605 P.2d 314
(Utah 1979) .
Heslop argued that evidence of the accrual account problem
and

its investigation was relevant to whether Heslop was

terminated for good cause (R. 1106), and that the court's denial
of the Bank's motion in limine regarding this evidence meant it
was relevant to the issue of constructive discharge.

(R. 1089)

This is clearly not the case. When the court dismissed Heslop's
public policy claim, he stated this evidence was only relevant
to the good cause issue.

(Tr. 1263-64)

It was error for the

court not to instruct the jury to disregard this evidence with
regard

to

the

contract issues.

constructive

discharge

and

implied-in-fact

Absent this prejudicial evidence, the Bank

submits it would have obtained a more favorable result on the
constructive discharge and implied-in-fact contract issues.
The Bank submits this evidence was not relevant to any
issue.

The underlying assumption for the position that the
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evidence was relevant to the issue of good cause is that the
Bank's reassignment of Heslop in January 19 8 3 and its removal of
his lending authority in September 1983 was a pretext, and that
the real reason the Bank took these actions was because it was
upset with Heslop for his conduct in 1981 and 1982 and wanted to
terminate him.
This theory does not follow factually.

If.the Bank was

upset enough with Heslop for his conduct in 1981-82 to find some
pretext for terminating him, then Browning's refusal to accept
Heslopfs offer of resignation in January 198 3 makes absolutely
no sense.

The only reasonable and logical conclusion is that

when Browning refused to accept the offer of resignation in
January of 1983, any causal connection between the events in
1981-82 and Heslop's leaving the Bank in October, 1983 was cut
off. Browning's refusal is an independent, intervening act that
precludes any such causal connection. The trial court based his
dismissal of Heslop's public policy claim in part on the very
fact that Browning's refusal to accept Heslop's offer to resign
in January, 198 3, cut off any causal connection between events
preceding that date and Heslop's termination.

(Tr. 1149-51)

This absence of any causal connection is further solidified
because the Bank did not include Heslop in the June and October
1983 reductions in force, clearly good cause for termination.
See Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483
(Utah 1989) .
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Heslop argued

lf

[t]here was no evidence presented at trial

that Browning was angry enough at Heslop to request his
resignation in January, 1983 . . .•"
fl

(R. 1080)

[n]o one suggested that Browning was

Heslop at that point in time."
These statements
claims.

He also said

f

mad enough to fire1

(R. 1107)

are absolutely

contrary

to Heslopfs

Everything involving the accrual accpunt problem, its

investigation, and the hiring of Timmons had already happened by
the time Heslop offered to resign in January of 1983. These are
the facts upon which Heslop relied to claim he fell from favor
and that the Bank wanted to get rid of him. If Heslop is saying
his conduct in 1981-82 was insufficient to cause the Bank to
want to terminate him in January 1983, then it is irrational, as
well as illogical, to argue that evidence of that same conduct
is relevant to establish a pretextual reason for the Bank's
rescission of Heslop's lending authority approximately nine
months later.

Such a position makes no sense.

In addition, evidence of termination of other employees was
irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible under Rule 403, U.R.E.
Therefore, in determining whether there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict, evidence of the accrual
problem, the state's investigations thereof, the hiring of
Timmons, his salary, payments to Peat, Marwick, and termination
of other employees should be disregarded.
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B.

Heslop Voluntarily Resigned and Was Not »
Constructively Discharged.
The

relevant

evidence

on

the

issue

{

of

constructive

discharge was the reorganization of the Bank in January 1983 and
the rescission of Heslopfs lending authority on September 29,
1983.

{

This evidence was, as a matter of law, insufficient to

allow a jury to find a constructive discharge. It did not meet
the legal standard set forth in Instruction 15 that an employee

i

"must establish by a preponderance of the evidence deliberate
actions on the part of the employer which amounts to harassment
and makes or allows the employee's working conditions to become

(

so intolerable that the employee has no reasonable option except
to resign. . . . "

[emphasis added.]

The jury's verdict also did not meet the legal standard of

<

Instruction 16 that an employee who resigns when there is a
reasonable alternative thereto has voluntarily resigned.
Heslop had a reasonable alternative to resignation in
October, 1983.
same salary.

.

He was still a senior vice president with the
(Tr. 1094-95, 1286; see Exh. 16-P)

He could

perform all the duties of a lending officer except commit on
loans without the approval of West or Kleyn.

Heslop did not

work even one day after his lending authority was rescinded. He
did not attempt to talk to Timmons about the change. (Tr. 1286)
Kleyn, West, Browning and Timmons all testified that Heslop
could have continued working as a loan officer.

(Tr. 569, 774,
i
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791, 1094-96, 1286) His failure to do so made his resignation
voluntary, as a matter of law.
In Flanagan v. McKesson Corp., 708 F.Supp. 1287 (N.D. Ga.
1988), Flanagan was demoted to the position of field sales
representative after 17 years of employment.

He resigned

without working a day at the new job. He claimed constructive
discharge.

The Court granted summary judgment for defendant.

The court cited Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 807 F.2d 1536
(11th Cir. 1987) for the proposition that

lf

[p]art of an

employee's obligation to be reasonable is an obligation not to
assume the worst, and not to jump to conclusions too fast." 708
F.Supp. at 1288-89

The court further held that hurt feelings

due to a demotion do not constitute a constructive discharge,
and that failure to work even one day after the changed
assignment was unreasonable.

The evidence was insufficient to

present a jury issue.
Heslop had an obligation not to assume the worst when his
lending authority was withdrawn and to pursue the clearly
reasonable alternative of working at the job for a reasonable
period of time. Where he failed to do that, his resignation was
voluntary.
In Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360 (9th Cir.
1987), the court stated that an employee must prove he "was
subjected to incidents of differential treatment over a period
of months or years" in order to establish a constructive
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discharge.

823 F.2d at 361. Heslop's claims do not meet this

standard. The reorganization affected numerous Bank employees,
not just Heslop.

(Tr. 1053-54, 1056, 1065-66, 1247-48, 1474)

When Heslop's lending authority was rescinded, West's was
substantially reduced, and the policy allowing combining of
authorities was restricted.
16-P)

(Tr. 568-69, 1091, 1283-84; Exh.

Even assuming the rescissioin of lending authority was

directed exclusively at Heslop, it is "a 'single isolated
instance'" which "is insufficient as a matter of law to support
a finding of constructive discharge."

823 F.2d at 361.

The Utah Supreme Court discussed constructive discharge in
Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979).

Bihlmaier quit

his job as manager of Carson's grocery store because Carson
indicated on Bihlmaier's loan application that he had been hired
on a trial basis only, which resulted in denial of the loan.
Bihlmaier claimed he was constructively discharged.

The trial

court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and
plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of the employmentat-will doctrine, but stated, in dicta, that an employer can
constructively discharge an employee if the employer's words and
actions "logically lead a prudent man to believe his tenure has
been terminated."

604 P.2d at 792, footnote 5
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The court found that Carson's statement would not logically
lead a prudent person to believe his employment had been
terminated.

Id.

The standard to be applied is not subjective. The employee
must prove a reasonably prudent person would consider the
employer's

words

and

actions

to

mean

the

employee

was

terminated.
In Knee v. School Dist. No. 139 in Canyon Cty., 106 Idaho
152, 676 P.2d 727 (Idaho App. 1984), Knee had a written threeyear employment contract as school district superintendent.
During a regularly scheduled review of the contract, the school
board demanded Knee's resignation.

Although Knee asked for a

chance to think about it overnight, the chairman of the board
told Knee they wanted

his resignation

immediately.

Knee

therefore submitted his resignation that day.
Knee later filed an action for wrongful discharge.

The

trial court found Knee voluntarily resigned and dismissed his
action at the close of his case. Knee appealed.
The Idaho Appellate Court affirmed and stated " . . . it is
not appropriate to apply the doctrine of constructive discharge
absent

. . . harassment, intimidation, coercion or other

aggravating conduct . . . which renders working conditions
intolerable. . . .

A mere request to resign, without more, is

not sufficient to warrant a finding of constructive discharge.
676 P.2d at 730.
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In the instant case, Heslop's claim that the Bank expressly
demanded his resignation was not corroborated by any witnesses,
(Tr. 1559-60) In Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d 1096 (Utah
1989), the Supreme Court upheld a lower court's finding that
plaintiff had no claim for wrongful termination based in part on
its review of the record which revealed no corroboration for
plaintiff's testimony on a critical fact issue.
Wilson v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs. of Cty. of Adams, 70 3 P.2d
1257 (Colo. 1985), involved a claim of constructive discharge by
Wilson, an employee of Adams County since 1962.

Wilson was

hired as a receptionist. Nine years later, she assumed clerical
and

secretarial duties.

During the entire time she was

employed, she was a substitute receptionist.
In 1979, Wilson was given primary back-up receptionist
responsibility.

Wilson objected, claiming seniority, and also

that stress from receptionist work caused medical problems.
The assignment was not changed.

As a result, Wilson took

leave for several months, failed to return by a specified
deadline, and was terminated.
Wilson sued for constructive discharge. The jury returned
a verdict for her, and the county appealed.

The Colorado

Supreme Court reversed and remanded, directing the district
court to enter judgment in favor of defendant.
The court noted that even before the assignment as primary
back-up receptionist was given, Wilson had worked as a back-up
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for six years. The back-up assignment was within the scope of
Wilson's job duties.

Even evidence of medical or emotional

problems associated with the job did not constitute constructive
discharge.
Wilson is analogous to Heslopfs case.

Heslop complained

when his duties were changed in January, 198 3 to commercial loan
officer with a specialty in agricultural loans. However, Heslop
had specialized in agricultural lending for years.
547, 816-17)

(See Tr.

From January, 1983 until the time of his

termination, Heslop was also a commercial loan officer, which he
had been for years before the reorganization.

His lending

authority was increased after the reorganization.

(Tr. 369-70,

376, 392-95, 1054-55, 1249-50; see Exh. 2-P)
In Christie v. San Miguel Cty. School Dist., 759 P.2d 779
(Colo.App. 1988), plaintiff was a school teacher under contract
to teach music for all grades.

Her position was changed to

permanent substitute teacher at the same salary. She refused to
accept this position, resigned
discharge.

The

trial

court

and

granted

sued

for

constructive

a directed verdict,

plaintiff appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed.
The court listed the conduct Christie claimed proved
constructive discharge:
Plaintiff argues that she met her
burden by showing that: (1) she was asked
to resign; (2) the district had a motive to
force her to resign, i.e., it did not have
sufficient funds to engage a "full-time"
substitute; (3> the transfer was in essence
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a demotion; and (4) the transfer involved a
significant change in duties.
Id, at 78 3. The court rejected all these arguments. It
held that requesting an employee to resign, standing alone, does
not constitute constructive discharge "unless accompanied by
harassment, coercion, or other employer conduct which makes the
working

conditions

intolerable."

[Id.]

Christie

never

testified that her working conditions were in fact intolerable.
Heslop never worked after his lending authority was withdrawn.
His claim that working conditions were intolerable without
lending authority is purely speculation. Since he did work for
several months after the reorganization, that change clearly did
not create intolerable working conditions.
The Colorado court also stated "the mere fact of a change
in

duties

is

demonstration

insufficient

to

constitute

of constructive discharge."

a

prima

[Id.]

facie

Christie

refused to perform her new duties. Heslop refused to work with
rescinded lending authority.

Christie ultimately resigned and

so did Heslop. Christie was not constructively discharged, and
neither was Heslop.
In Adams v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Com'n, 776 P.2d 639
(Utah App. 1989), the Board of Review denied benefits because
the employee "'voluntarily left work without good cause.1"
Adams appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Adams was employed as a mechanic with Facet Automotive
Filter Company.

Facet asked Adams to work the night shift for
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two weeks because another employee was injured.

When Adams

refused to work nights, Facet refused to let him work days, and
Adams quit.
On appeal, Adams claimed he was constructively discharged.
The court disagreed and stated:
. . . Plaintiff argues that since he
was given a choice of working the night
shift "or else," he had no choice at all
and was thus constructively discharged.
Notwithstanding plaintiff's failure to
marshal the evidence, it is clear that
there
is substantial evidence in support
of
the
Board's
factual
findings.
Plaintiff, not Facet, made the decision to
sever the employment relationship.
776 P.2d at 641. Heslop had a choice. He could continue
working at the Bank subject to the limitation on his lending
authority, or he could resign. He voluntarily chose to resign.
In Lombardo v. Oppenheimer, 701 F.Supp. 29 (D. Conn. 1987),
plaintiff claimed she was constructively discharged because her
job duties were changed, her employer treated her coldly, and
her new duties were monotonous and demeaning.

The district

court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Even

though plaintiff's "duties did change somewhat," she retained
"the same job grade, class and salary . . . [and] [a]ny change
in her position was the result of a reorganization and not an
isolated incident of agency mistreatment of her."
at

31.

The court concluded

701 F.Supp.

"[pjlaintiff cannot claim a

constructive discharge, where there was 'no more than a change
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in job responsibility, based on a reasonable business decision
[by] . . . the employer1."
The

court

also

Id.

rejected

plaintiff's

claim

she

was

constructively discharged because defendants treated her coldly,
and because her job was monotonous and demeaning.

This was

simply a statement of plaintiff's subjective feelings.
Heslop's subjective feelings regarding his new position in
January,

198 3, and

also

after

his

lending

authority was

rescinded do not rise to the level of a constructive discharge.
In Neale v. Dillon, 534 F.Supp. 1381 (E.D. N.Y. 1982), the
district court tried Nealefs claim of sex discrimination and
constructive

discharge.

Neale was

attorney with supervisory duties.

an

assistant

district

She was passed over for a

promotion which, while she was on maternity leave, was given to
a male employee.

The same male employee was given her office.

When Neale returned to work following maternity leave, she found
her personal belongings outside the office in a shopping cart.
She was forced to search for another desk and was given a
position with no supervisory duties. Neale resigned. In spite
of all the above, the court ruled plaintiff had not proven
constructive discharge:
A claim of constructive discharge must
be supported by more than the employee's
subjective opinion that his or her position
has become so intolerable and difficult
that he or she must resign. . . . The court
does not find that Nealefs situation had
become so intolerable that a reasonable
person would feel forced to resign. . . .
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Although Neale was transferred to a nonsupervisory position, the transfer was at
no loss of pay. The court finds that if
she thought her position intolerable it was
due to her own perception that the
promotion of Schoenberg to deputy bureau
chief and her transfer to the appeals
bureau in a non-supervisory position were
damaging
to
her
prestige.
While
understandable, particularly in the context
of the manner in which she learned of
Schoenberg's
appointment,
and
the
clumsiness of her superiors removing her
property from her office, her embarrassment
does not constitute constructive discharge.
534 F.Supp. at 1390.

Finstad v. Montana Power Co., 241

Mont. 10, 785 P. 2d 1372 (1990), was a claim by a petroleum
engineer who had 22V6 years with his employer. When the employer
transferred him from Cutbank to Butte, Montana, Finstad refused
and claimed he had been constructively discharged.

After a

verdict entered in favor of plaintiff, the Montana Supreme Court
reversed and directed entry of judgment for defendant, holding
that Finstad had not been constructively discharged because he
had the alternative of accepting the transfer, notwithstanding
the fact it was undesirable to him.
The jury's finding that Heslop did not voluntarily quit is
not supported by substantial evidence.

The Bank believes this

finding was a result of prejudice engendered against it because
of evidence improperly admitted.

See Point I.A., supra.
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C.

Heslop Did Not Have an Implied-in-Fact Contract
Terminable Only for Good Cause.
The critical issue in determining whether an implied-in-

fact contract exists is whether both parties intended such. If
the employee intended it, but the employer did not, then no such
contract exists.
The evidence, taken most favorably to plaintiff, was that
various employees believed the Bank's employment policy was to
terminate only for good cause. However, every employee who so
testified had signed a written, express employment at-will
agreement.

The Bank used the same at-will language in its

employment applications from the time Heslop was first hired in
1955 until the present date.

It was the Bank's intent to

maintain the right to terminate employees at-will.
states

"[an]

implied-in-fact

promise

contradict a written contract term."
written

terms

of

Heslop's

cannot,

of

Berube
course,

771 P. 2d at 1044.

employment

agreement

The

should,

therefore, control.
When a former employee was rehired, his prior written
agreement was revived and continued in force. A new one was not
signed.

This occurred with Heslop and several other re-hired

employees.

(Tr. 693-94, 884-85, 1016-17, 1354-56, 1434)

Even if Heslop's written agreement is not specifically
controlling, the written employment applications established the
Bank's intent that employment was at-will.

It was Heslop's

burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that that was
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not the Bankfs intent. Other than Heslop's testimony, there was
no substantial evidence that anyone in authority ever stated the
Bank's policy was to terminate only for cause.

There was,

however, testimony from Beutler and Browning either that no such
statements were made or they could not recall such statements
being made.

(Tr. 886-87, 919, 1017-18) Kennedy also testified

he never made such statements when he interviewed prospective
employees.

(Tr. 1356-57)

The Employee Handbook contained no

statement that employees can be terminated only for cause.
(Exh. 27-P)
Berube was careful to limit the application of the impliedin-fact theory:
The ability of employees to bring causes
of action based upon express or implied-infact promises by the employer will not
eliminate the at-will construction of most
employment
contracts.
Courts
have
expressed concern that due deference be
paid to managerial discretion and normal
employment decisions.
771 P.2d at 1045-46 (emphasis added).

In Gianaculas v.

Transworld Airlines, Inc., 761 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1985), the
court rejected an implied-in-fact theory with the following
language:
. . . The employment application completed
by the applicants expressly states that
employment is terminable at will.
This
term contradicts the notion that the
parties agreed to limitations upon at-will
employment.
As a California appellate
court recently held . . . "[t]here cannot
be a valid express contract and an implied
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:

contract each embracing the same subject,
but requiring different results."

Id. at 1394 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied).

The

only express employment contract Heslop signed made him an atHeslopfs

will employee.

implied-in-fact theory must fail

because it requires a different result than does the written
contract.

For a similar holding, see Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum

& Chemical Corp., 608 P.Supp. 1315, 1320 (D.C.Cal. 1984) (Noting
that "[a] valid express agreement precludes a contradictory
implied

contract

embracing

the

same

subject"

matter

and

rejecting an employee's implied-in-fact contract theory).
Heslop claims his superiors gave him oral assurances of
continued

employment

adequately.

The

as long

alleged

as he performed

conversations

his duties

do not

constitute

sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that Heslop's
employment was terminable at will.
The Utah Supreme Court rejected an employee's claim of an
implied-in-fact employment contract based upon his selective
interpretations

and

subjective

understandings

of

oral

conversations with superiors. Rose v. Allied Development Co.,
719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986) .
D.

In the Alternative, There Was Good Cause to Terminate.
Even if good cause was required, there was sufficient

evidence of good cause, as a matter of law.
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Heslop failed
required

to meet the specific $50,000 condition

by his superior, Gerald West, before closing the

Gabbert loan.

(Tr. 430, 432-33, 557-58, 786-87, 1077, 1079-80,

1278-79, 1388-89; Exh. 7-P and 12-P) Heslop misrepresented the
facts relating to that condition when asked about additional
collateral by Boyd Carlsen, the bank's loan review officer.
Heslop falsely stated Dr. Gabbert invested $50,000 into the
project.

(Tr. 442-44, 446-47, 567, 714, 716-18, 727-34, 743,

747-48, 753-55; Exh. 15-P and 55-D)

Heslop knew that was not

true.
Heslop was highly critical of Bank management, to the point
of insubordination and disloyalty.

He stated Browning was

incapable of running the Bank, that Timmons should not be
president, and that Kunz should be removed as legal counsel, all
clear statements in opposition to decisions which the Board had
an absolute right to make without Heslopfs approval.

(Tr. 48 3-

88; Exh. 39-Pb at 20-21)
West testified that disloyalty constitutes good cause, and
that statements such as those made by Heslop show disloyalty.
(Tr. 549, 580-81)
In Hutchinson v. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772 (Utah 1984),
plaintiff was employed as a county jailer in Beaver County. His
deposition was taken as part of a lawsuit in which he was named
as a defendant.

His lawyer was provided by Beaver County.
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During the deposition, plaintiff's "conduct . . . was
marked by conflict with both" the opposing party's attorney and
his own attorney.

As a result, plaintiff was permanently

suspended.
Plaintiff sued for wrongful discharge.

The trial court

granted summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the employer
was justified in terminating an employee upon evidence of only
one incident of misconduct. The facts in the instant case meet
that criterion.
The trial court apparently believed the accrual problem and
related evidence was relevant to the issue of good cause. The
Bank disagrees.
First,

the

It's position on good cause is two-fold.
Gabbert

loan.

Second,

disloyalty

and

insubordination, not because of Heslop's opposition to the
Bank's method of resolving the accrual problem or anything
Heslop did with respect to the state's investigations, but
because Heslop was generally critical of the Board's major
policy decisions from approximately December, 1982, until Heslop
left, including the hiring of Timmons, the reorganization, and
the new loan policy.
The Bank had an absolute right to hire whomever it wanted
as president.

Heslop had no right to be made president.

Despite plaintiff's innuendo and speculation, there was no
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evidence of wrongdoing or misconduct associated with Timmons'
hiring.

Evidence associated with his hiring and payments to

Peat, Marwick was not relevant to the issue of good cause.
Heslop's failure to follow Bank policy and to meet the
condition for closure of the Gabbert loan certainly provided the
Bank with reasonable grounds to believe sufficient cause existed
to take disciplinary action.

See Kesterbaum v. Pennzoil Co.,

108 N.M. 20, 766 P.2d 280, 287 (1988).

If this disciplinary

action is deemed a constructive discharge, there was, therefore,
good cause which eliminates any basis for Heslopfs claims.
POINT II.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE BANK IS ENTITLED TO
A NEW TRIAL.
A.

Insufficiency of the Evidence.
This Court can reverse the trial court's denial of the

Bank's motion for new trial if "the evidence is insufficient to
support the verdict."

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d at 17.

Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6), U.R.C.P., the Bank is entitled
to a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to justify
the verdict or judgment or that it is against law. See Point I,
supra.

The verdict was against law because the jury failed to

apply the legal standard enunciated in the court's instructions
on constructive discharge.

64
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

Error in Law or Abuse of Discretion, Which Was
Prejudicial and Prevented a Fair Trial.
Rule 59(a)(1), U.R.C.P. allows the court to grant a new

trial if there was some irregularity in the proceedings of the
court, jury or adverse party or any order of the court, or abuse
of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a
fair trial. Rule 59(a)(7) allows the court to grant a new trial
due to error in law.
The improper admission of evidence regarding the accrual
problem, the state's investigations thereof, the hiring and
salary of Timmons, payments to Peat, Marwick, wash entries, and
of terminations of other employees was error in law, prejudicial
and prevented the bank from receiving a fair trial.

It

is

impossible to reasonably believe that repeated references to
these matters were not prejudicial

or that they did not

substantially affect the jury in rendering a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff.
A new trial should

be granted

even where the court

dismisses the claim which was the basis for admission of the
prejudicial evidence.

In Almonte v. National Union Fire Ins.

Co., 705 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1983), plaintiff brought suit on an
insurance policy arising from a fire loss. At the conclusion of
plaintiff's case, the court directed a verdict for defendant on
plaintiff's bad faith claim.

The court failed to instruct the

jury to disregard the bad faith evidence.
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The trial court denied defendant's motion for new trial,
the Court of Appeals reversed and stated:
Because of prejudicial error in failing
to counteract the prejudice created when
the jury heard these statements and
evidence [concerning bad faith], this court
has no choice but to reverse.
705 F.2d at 569. In the instant case, the trial court did
not direct the jury to disregard the prejudicial evidence after
dismissing Heslop's public policy claims. The jury should have
been told that evidence was irrelevant and should be disregarded
absent a public policy claim.

The Bank would have obtained a

more favorable result had the court so instructed the jury.
Doubts regarding possible prejudice should be resolved in
favor of the Bank.

In Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah

1985), evidence was admitted concerning the decedent's illegal
purchase and consumption of alcohol the day before the accident.
Following a defense verdict, plaintiff appealed.

The Supreme

Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the prejudicial
effect of the evidence outweighed any relevance it had.
court resolved doubts in favor of the appellant:
We do not know why the jury found Evan's
negligence to be the sole proximate cause
of his death. It may have been because of
removing his life jacket. If so, evidence
of his drinking was not prejudicial.
However, we have no way of knowing this and
cannot presume that the jury was not
influenced by the evidence of his drinking.
. . . The jury's verdict could well have
been the effect of shifting its attention
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The

away from the facts of the case and judging
every one of Evan's actions before and
after the disabled craft drifted away as a
natural consequence of alcohol-induced
debility. The probative value of testimony
of so little substance coming in with such
great latitude was clearly outweighed by
the prejudicial effect it may have had on a
jury.
* * * *

The erroneous admission of the testimony
might be compared to a drop of ink placed
in a vessel of milk. It cannot long be
seen, but it surely remains there to
pollute its contents.
701 P.2d at 494.

Further irregularities occurred due to

improper conduct of plaintiff's counsel.
In Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 748 P. 2d
1067 (Utah 1987) the trial court granted defendant's motion for
new

trial

because

of

"improper

and

prejudicial"

closing

argument. See 748 P. 2d at 1067-68 On appeal, the Supreme Court
affirmed and stated:
Counsel's remarks appear
motivated by a desire to stir up the jury
emotionally
against
IHC.
We have
previously
held
that
"pleas plainly
designed to elicit sympathy or to inspire
passion or prejudice should not be
allowed." Eager v. Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314,
320, 410 P.2d 1003, 1007 (1966).
748 P.2d at 1068. In the instant case plaintiff's counsel
appealed to the prejudice, passion and sympathy of the jury by
implying that plaintiff was terminated because he was honest,
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that all of the other directors and officers involved in the
decisions

related

criminals,

and

to

that

the

accrual

Browning

and

problem
Kunz

were

lied

to

dishonest
a state

investigator, which was a clear misrepresentation of the record.
Such misrepresentations show Heslop intended the jury to focus
on facts which were highly prejudicial to the Bank. His desire
was to make the Bank look as bad as possible in every aspect of
its business, regardless of whether it bore any reasonable
relationship whatsoever to Heslopfs claims, and after the court
had dismissed the public policy claim.
Another irregularity which prevented a fair trial was
plaintiff's counsel's improper representations to the court
regarding his reasons for submitting evidence of Timmons1
hiring, his salary, and payments made by the Bank to Peat
Marwick before and after Timmons was hired.
Counsel told the court Timmons acquired information during
the audit regarding Browning and Kunz which he could have used
against them with the Bank Commissioner.
Counsel

claimed

this

resulted

(Tr. 1126, 1156)

in a sweetheart

employment

contract for Timmons, and subsequently to large, improper
payments by the Bank to Timmons1 former employer (Peat Marwick).
He implied Timmons was getting kickbacks from Peat Marwick due
to the Bankf s payments.
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Timmons gave no testimony which even remotely supported
plaintiff's position, yet all the evidence with all its innuendo
of wrongdoing by the Bank had been admitted.

It was highly

improper for plaintiff's counsel to represent the relevance of
the above-specified evidence, when he knew he could not and in
fact

did

not, connect

the

evidence

to his

theory

of a

"sweetheart deal" and improper payments.
Evidence

of termination

of other

irrelevant and prejudicial to the Bank.

employees was also
The facts surrounding

Beutler's resignation were not remotely related to Heslop's
case.

Yet Beutler's testimony suggested the Bank bought his

resignation.

The Bank obviously disputed this, but it was

another example of Heslop's approach to make the Bank look as
bad as possible with regard to events that had nothing to do
with Heslop's termination.
The same is true of Carlsen's termination.,
and escorted from the Bank.
like a crook.

He was fired

He claimed the Bank treated him

It was a very emotional event for Carlsen.

happened after Heslop had left the Bank's employ.

It

(Tr. 722-23)

It had nothing to do with Heslop's termination, but again
blackened the image of the Bank in the eyes of the jury.
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POINT III.
THE BERUBE CASE SHOULD
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.

NOT

HAVE

BEEN

In his concurring opinion in Berube, Justice Zimmerman
stated:
Because the law in this area is in a state
of flux, and because the at-will doctrine
has become well entrenched in our law and
any
change in it has the potential to
affect the practices of almost every
employer in Utah, we must proceed with care
in recognizing exceptions to that doctrine.
All that being said, we are reversing and
remanding this matter for tri'al and are
signaling a change in the employment-atwill law of Utah.
771 P. 2d at 1050-51. When a change in the law occurs, the
court has discretion to apply that change prospectively only.
Since Berube changed the doctrine upon which the Bank relied in
the past, it should have been applied prospectively only and not
to terminations of employment that occurred before the date of
the decision.

See Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).

In Bimbo v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital, 644 F.Supp.
1033 (D. N.J. 1986), the federal district court applied a change
in the employment at-will doctrine announced in a New Jersey
Supreme

Court

decision

prospectively

only

and

held

that

plaintiff had no claim for breach of contract. Bimbo contended
she was constructively discharged as a result of a demotion,
which violated her employer's personnel policy manual.
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Her

demotion occurred some three years before the change in the law.
The Federal

District

Court

refused

to

apply

this change

retroactively because it "would be distinctly unfair to those .
. . who had previously acted in reliance upon the prior state of
the law."
Berube made significant changes in Utah's
will doctrine.

employment at-

Berube went beyond the exceptions previously

identified in Rose v. Allied Dev. Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986).
Rose recognized an exception to the at-will doctrine where the
employee could show an implied or express stipulation as to the
duration of the employment agreement.

See 719 P. 2d at 85.

Heslop's testimony was contradictory on this point. He said no
one committed employment for any fixed period of time (Tr. 293),
but also that he was promised employment until retirement at age
65.

(Tr. 296) However, Berube allows an employee to overcome

the at-will doctrine by implication, not simply with respect to
the duration of the contract but to the very issue of whether
the person is an at-will employee.
Berube also held mutuality of contract has no application.
This is a clear change from Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P. 2d 870
(Utah 1978), which held employees were entitled to quit whenever
they wanted to and employers were entitled to fire employees
whenever they wanted to.
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The Bank relied on the at-will rule in the Beutler lawsuit
and obtained summary judgment in that case in 1984 in part
because Beutler was an at-will employee. At the time Heslop was
hired, during his entire employment with the Bank, and at the
time Heslop terminated from the Bank, the at-will doctrine was
the

law

in Utah.

More than

five years

after Heslop1 s

termination, the Supreme Court changed the at-will rule.

Had

Berube not been applied to this case, the Bank submits Heslop
would have been found to be an employee-at-will who had no valid
cause of action.
POINT IV.
HESLOP'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS.
Heslopfs claim to have entered a contract in 1962 for
employment until retirement at age 65 terminable only for good
cause was an agreement which by its terms was not to be
performed within one year of its making.

In 1962, Heslop had

more than 30 years' work life left before he would reach age 65.
(See Exh. 1-P showing Heslop's birth date to be 5-8-30.) Such
a contract must be in writing, signed by the Bank or it is
unenforceable under Utah Code Ann. .£25-5-4(1) There was no such
writing.
McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F.Supp. 1108 (D.
Mass. 1980), held that an implied-in-fact agreement to employ a
person until his normal retirement date was within the statute
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of

frauds,

and

absent

sufficient

proof

of

a

writing

memorializing the contract, was unenforceable.
In Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F.Supp. 822 (E.D. N.Y.
1980), plaintiff claimed he had an express or implied employment
agreement terminable only for cause.
The court rejected plaintiff's argument and stated:
New
York
cases
involving
oral
contracts for permanent or life-time
employment have held that they may be
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
Based on Heslop's own testimony of the terms of his
employment contract with the Bank, it could not have been
performed within one year and therefore falls within the statute
of frauds. Since the contract was not memorialized in a writing
signed by the Bank, the alleged contract terminable only for
good cause is unenforceable.
CONCLUSION
The Bank requests this Court to reverse the judgment and
remand the case with instructions to the trial court to enter
judgment for the Bank because the relevant evidence establishes
as a matter of law that:
a)

Heslop voluntarily resigned;

b)

Heslop did

not have an implied-in-fact

contract

terminable only for cause;
c)

The Bank had good cause to terminate Heslop; and/or

d)

Heslop's claims are barred by the statute of frauds.
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In the alternative, the Bank requests the Court to reverse
and remand for a new trial due to insufficiency of the evidence
and/or admission of prejudicial evidence and argument with
instructions that such evidence and argument are inadmissible.
Respectfully submitted this

/ J^

day of March, 1991.

STRONG & HANNI

By.
Glenn C. Hanni
Stuart H. Schultz
Attorneys for The Bank of
Utah

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing document were hand delivered this
, 1991, to the following:
Ronald E. Griffin
Valley Bank Tower
50 West 300 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Ivan J. Heslpp

3/200051nh
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ADDENDUM INDEX
Rules and Statutes.
Order and Judgment dated July 10, 1989.
Judgment on Verdict dated August 27, 1990.
Order dated October 16, 1990, Denying the Bank's Motion for
J.N.O.V. or, in the Alternative, For New Trial.
Bank's Notice of Appeal dated November 13, 1990.
Trial Transcript, Pages 1120-30, 1152-65 involving hearings
regarding evidence of Timmons' salary and payments to Peat,
Marwick.
Order dated June 13, 1990, denying the Bank's Motion in
Limine regarding the accrual problem.
Trial Transcript, Pages 1263-64, containing the trial
court's ruling that evidence of the accrual problem was
relevant to good cause issue after dismissal of public
policy claim.
Trial Transcript:
a)

Pages
1590, 1610, 1654-55 containing Heslop's
counsel's
arguments
regarding
Ron
Draughon's
testimony;

b)

Pages 976-78 containing Ron Draughon's testimony
regarding his conversations with Browning and Kunz;

c)

Page 1218 containing a question to Browning on crossexamination regarding his conversation with Draughon,
an objection, and the court's ruling.

Trial Transcript, Pages 63-64, 1607, 1655, 1657-58, 1661
containing portions of Heslop's counsel's opening statement
and closing argument regarding dishonesty and criminal
conduct.
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Rule 103- Rulings on evidence.
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection, In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making
of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of
the court.

Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable
in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former rule defined relevant evidence as that having a tendency to

prove or disprove the existence of any "material fact." Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" accords with the application given to
former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court,
State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissibleAll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Rule 403- Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
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7-1-318. Reports of condition — Minimum number required — Form — Verification — Publication —
Falsification or failure to file.
The commissioner shall make not less than two calls annually for report of
condition upon each depository institution under the jurisdiction of the department. The report shall be made according to the form prescribed by the
commissioner and shall be verified by the oath or affirmation of the president
or a vice president and attested by at least three directors. Except as provided
in Chapter 9 with respect to publishing or mailing reports of credit unions, a
copy of the report, duly certified by the commissioner, shall be published by
the institution making the report in a newspaper having general circulation
in the county where the principal office of the institution is located. Proof of
publication shall be filed in the office of the commissioner within 30 days after
the time of receipt by the institution of the copy certified by the commissioner.
The commissioner may require a report of condition of any financial institution under the jurisdiction of the department whenever he considers it necessary.
(1) Any officer, director, or employee of a financial institution who
knowingly subscribes or causes to be made any false statement or report
to the commissioner or the supervisor having jurisdiction over t h a t institution or any false entry in the books or accounts of the institution or
knowingly subscribes or exhibits false papers with intent to deceive any
person authorized to examine the institution or knowingly states or publishes any false report or statement of the institution is guilty of a felony
of the third degree.
(2) Every institution which fails or neglects to make a report within 30
days after receipt of a call for any report required by the provisions of this
title, an order of the commissioner, or any regulation of the department
shall be subject to such penalty for each day's delay in transmitting such
report as the commissioner may prescribe by regulation.
(3) Every officer and employee of a financial institution under the jurisdiction of the department required by law to take an oath or affirmation who wilfully swears falsely, is guilty of the criminal offense of perjury.
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment
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25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless
signed.

written

and

The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be
charged with the agreement:
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one
year from the making of the agreement;
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Glenn C. Hanni #A1327
Stuart H. Schultz #2886
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7080
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IVAN J. HESLOP,
Plaintiff/

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Civil No. CV-99381

vs.
BANK OF UTAH, a Utah
banking corporation,
Defendant.

JUL 13 1989

Defendant's motion for summary judgment was heard by the
Honorable David E. Roth, District Judge, on June 7, 1989.
Glenn C. Hanni and Stuart H. Schultz of the law firm of Strong &
Hanni appeared on behalf of defendant, and Ronald E. Griffin of
the law firm of Freestone & Griffin appeared on behalf of
plaintiff.

The court, having considered the motion, memoranda,

and pleadings, and further having considered oral argument of the
parties, now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:

1.

The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Berube v. Fashion
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Centre, Ltd,

P.2d

(Utah 1989), 104 U-A.R. 4,

shall be applied retroactively to the claims involved in this
case;
2.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to

plaintiff's claims of breach of implied-in-fact contract and
contractual wrongful discharge, including the claim of a public
policy violation, is denied;
3.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to

plaintiff's fifth cause of action for tortious wrongful discharge
is taken under advisement by the court, and the court reserves
ruling on the issue of whether a claim by plaintiff of a public
policy violation by defendant constitutes a tort claim or a
contract claim until the time of pre-trial of the case, and the
parties are allowed to submit briefs to the court on that issue
prior to the pre-trial, all subject to any clarifying decision(s)
issued by the Utah Supreme Court on this issue between the date
of this order and the date of pre-trial;
4.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to all

plaintiff's remaining causes of action is granted, and judgment
dismissing said causes of action, with prejudice, on the merits,
shall be entered.
Pursuant to the foregoing order of the court, and good cause
appearing, now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
<
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1.

......

That judgment of no cause of action is hereby entered in

favor of defendant and against plaintiff on plaintiff's second
cause of action for promissory estoppel and plaintiff's third
cause of action for breach of implied-in-law covenant of good
faith and fair dealing on the grounds that such causes of action
in the context of an employee's wrongful discharge claim are not
recognized, as a matter of law, in the state of Utah;
2.

That judgment of no cause of action is hereby entered in

favor of defendant and against plaintiff on plaintiff's sixth
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact
with respect to such cause of action and that reasonable persons
could not differ on the conclusion that the undisputed facts show
plaintiff has no cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and
3.

Plaintiff's second cause of action, third cause of

action, and sixth cause of action are hereby dismissed, with
prejudice, on the merits.
DATED this

fO

S\

day of

/?
ieWl989.

/ v/ BY THE COURT
V

Honorable David E. Roth
District Judge

3
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Ronald E. Griffin"
Freestone & Griffin
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing order and Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, this
P-%

day of June, 1989, to the following:

Ronald E. Griffin
Freestone & Griffin
50 West 300 South #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff

BD001
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RONALD E. GRIFFIN (4584)
FREESTONE & GRIFFIN
Attorney for Plaintiff
Valley Bank Tower
50 West 300 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-1500
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE CF UTAH

IVAN J- HESLOP,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

%

Civil No. frTOS^ttl
Honorable David E. Roth

BANK OF UTAH, a Utah
banking corporation,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable David E.
Roth for jury trial on Monday, July 16, 1990, at the hour of
9:30 a.m.
1990.

The Court concluded nine days of trial on August 1,

Plaintiff, Ivan J. Heslop, was present at trial and was

represented

by

his

Defendant,

Bank

of

representatives,

Roy

counsel
Utah,
Nelson

of

record,

appeared
and

Ronald

through

Roderick

E.

its

Browning,

Griffin.
designated
and

was

represented by its counsel of record, Glenn C. Hanni and Stuart H.
Schultz, of the law firm of Strong & Hanni.

Sworn testimony was

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•'

U < /

Indexed

taken from witnesses called by both parties to this action and
numerous exhibits were introduced into evidence. The jury rendered
a special verdict through answers to interrogatories propounded by
the Court.
Now, therefore, it is hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against defendant for general
damages in the amount of $160,000.00 together with costs, to the
date of judgment, in the amount of $

/ /£T/< ~?i¥ , plus post-

judgment interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% per annum from
the date of entry until paid.
DATED this <*- f day of August, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

David

^JRer€h

Second D i s t r i c t Court

-2-
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